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We have investigated the linear cryptanalysis of AES cipher in this article. As the previous encryption
standard DES could be broken by the linear cryptanalysis, NIST decided a new encryption standard
AES in 2000. We try to analyze one and two rounds AES cipher by the method of the linear
cryptanalysis and learn the limits of this method. AES cipher provides a conspicuous difficulty in
breaking its keys because of small bias of its S-box. We report the experimental results of success rate
and are led to conclusion that this method would not work well on more than 3 rounds to break keys.
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1 INTRODUCTION
We have investigated the linear cryptanalysis of AES
cipher in this article. The National Institute of Standard
and Technology (NIST) made a formal call for Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) in 1997 and selected
Rijndael block cipher as AES (FIPS 197) in 2000 (NIST,
2001), because Data Encryption Standard (DES), which
was the previous encryption standard in US since 1977
(NIST, 1977), could be broken by the linear
cryptanalysis, a kind of the chosen plain text attack
(Matsui, 1994) and was anxious for a lowering of
security. AES cipher uses 128-bit as a block length and
allows a variable key length among 128, 192 and 256-bit.
It iterates a round 10, 12 or 14 times depending key
length that is composed four different transformations,
ByteSub, ShiftRow, MixColumn and AddRoundkey.
Lucks (2000) improved the block cipher square attack
proposed by Daemen et al. (1997) on 7-rounds from
6-rounds and Ferguson et aI. (2001), 8 rounds.
We try to analyze one and two rounds AES cipher by
the method of the linear cryptanalysis proposed by
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Matsui (1994) and learn the limits of this method. The
cryptanalysis is based on a bias of S-box. As the absolute
value of maximum or minimum bias obtained from AES
S-box is much smaller than that from DES S-boxes, AES
cipher provides a conspicuous difficulty in breaking its
keys. We report the experimental results of success rate.
In due consideration of these results with bias, it seems
that this method would not work well on more than 3
rounds to break keys.
2 MATERIALS AND METHODS
2.1 Analysis of ByteSub
In this section, we describe a feature of ByteSub, a
constituent element of a round in AES cipher, which is
defined by S-box (SA)' SA has 8 input and 8 output bits.
For AES S-box (SA)' the number NSA(a,!3) of input (x)
satisfYing the linear relation for all XOR values of input
(x) and output (SA (x)) bits masked by a and !3 is defined
as follows:
NSA(a, P) =#{x lOs x < 255,
8 8
(EEl (x[s]. a[sD)= (EEl (S(x)[t]. p[tm}
s=O 1=0
(I)
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Fig. 1. The histogram of NSA(a,p) for AES S-box. The axes of abscissas and ordinates indicate the
value ofNSA(a,p), the number of pairs (a,p), respectively.
where a and P stand for mask of input bits and output
bits(l~a,p:::;255), the symbols #, (B,., the number of x
meeting the requirement, a bitwise XOR and AND. A
bias is defined as (NSA(a,p)-128)/256. The eight
different S-boxes are used for each 8 blocks in DES
cipher, while the only one common S-box is used for all
16 blocks in AES cipher. The maximum absolute value
of the biases for AES S-box is smaller than that for DES
S-boxes. The maximal bias realized in the fifth S-box
(Sos) in DES, that is, 20/64=0.31 and NSos(16,15)=12
(Matsui,1994). On the other hand, we found that for AES
S-box, the maximum absolute value of the bias was
16/256=0.0625 (NSA(a,p) being 112 or 144). We showed
the distribution of NSA(a,p) in Fig. I, and also the
number of pairs (a,p) for the maximum and minimum
biases in Table I. AES S-box has remarkable features
that the distribution ofNSA(a,p) is symmetrical about the
center (128) (Fig. I), and that there exist just five linear
approximations realizing the maximum or minimum bias
(±0.0625) for any input mask a(1~a:::;255), and for any
output mask P(1 ~P:::;255) too. Table 2 shows sets of
above five linear approximations for 1 bit output and
input cases.
2.2 Analysis of MixColumn
In this section, we describe a feature of MixColumn, a
constituent element of a round in AES cipher. This
MixColumn operation is carried out independently in
each word (32bits), where a state (128bits) dividing into
4 words. On considering a word as 4 byte vector, this
operation can be written by matrix multiplication on
GF(28), where the field structure of GF(28) was defined
by Daemen and Rijmen (2002).
bo 02 03 01 01 ao
bl 01 02 03 01 al
=b2 01 01 02 03 a2
b3 03 01 01 02 a3
a: input, b: output
The above expression is rewritten by the following
formula:
bi ='02'ea i (B'03'e a(i+l)mod 4(B'01'ea (i+2)mod 4
(B'01'e a(i+3) mod 4
(;=0,1,2,3) (2)
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Table 1. The numbers oflinear approximations for three maximum and minimum biases.
NSA(a,p) 112 114 116 140 142 144
Bias -0.0625 -0.05469 -0.04688 0.046875 0.054688 0.0625
Number 640 2040 4592 4588 2040 635
There is a perfect linear approximation for any output or
input mask in the operation (2). The formulae (3)
illustrate these perfect relations for I-bit output.
bi[O] = a i [7] EB a(i+l)mod4[7] EB a(i+l)mod4[0] EB a(i+2)mod4 [0] EB a(i+3)mod4[0]
bi [l] = a i [7]EEl ai[O] EEl a(i+l)mod4[7] EB a(i+l)mod4[1] EB a(i+l)mod4[0] EB a(i+2)mod4[1] EB a(i+3)mod4[1]
bi [2] = a i [1 ] EEl a(i+l)mod4[2] EB a(i+l)mod4[1] EB a(i+2)mod4 [2] EB a(i+3)mod4 [2]
bi [3] = a;[7] EEl a;[2] EEl a(i+l)mod4 [7] EB a(i+l)mod4 [3] EB a(i+l)mod4[2] EB a(i+2)mod4 [3] EB a(i+3)mod4 [3]
bi [4] = a i [7]EEl a i [3] EB a(i+l)mod4[7] EB a(i+l)mod4[4] EB a(i+l)mod4[3] EB a(i+2)mod4 [4] EB a(i+3)mod4 [4]
bi [5] = a i [4] EB a(i+l)mod4 [5] EB a(i+l)mod4 [4] EB a(i+2)mod4[S] EB a (i+3)mod4 [5]
bi [6] = ai[S] EB a(i+l)mod4[6] EB a(i+l)mod4[5] EB a(i+2)mod4[6] EB a(i+3)mod4[6]
bi [7] = a i [6] EB a(i+l)mod4 [7] EB a(i+l)mod4 [6] EB a(i+2)mod4[7] EB a(i+3)mod4[7]
(i=O, 1,2,3) (3)
Table 2. The linear approximations of the maximal bias (±O.06) for AES S-box having I bit output or input only.
Output(P) Bit Input(a)
1 0 45 103 142 163 196
2 1 77 106 151 176 253
4 2 106 + 128 + 176 + 218 + 234 +
8 3 53 + 64 + 117 + 216 + 237 +
16 4 34 + 70 + 100 + 170 + 206 +
32 5 4 185 189 224 228
64 6' 2 112 114 220 222
128 7 57 + 110 + 129 + 184 + 239 +
Input(a) Bit Output(P)
1 0 72 80 192 136 + 144 +
2 1 56 64 207 120 + 143 +
4 2 32 60 149 28 + 181 +
8 3 15 + 53 + 82 + 93 + 103 +
16 4 51 63 101 105 86 +
32 5 121 153 180 205 + 224 +
64 6 204 230 238 8 + 34 +
128 7 17 52 4 + 33 + 37 +
The symbol (+,-) after figure showing the signature of bias.
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2.3 Linear Analysis (I-Step)
Now we investigate attacking the AES code of 1 round.
We can ignore ShiftRow operation because it is easy to
break through this operation in attacking the AES code.
Thus, the attack process can deal with each word (32bit)
separately which makes up a state (l28bit).
Firstly, we introduce several notations using in this
article. The symbols P, C and K are used as plaintext,
ciphertext and key (32bit word). For a word A, Ai stands
for a byte part (8bit) ofA the position of which locates in
[8i, 8i+7] (i=0,1,2,3). For a byte B, BU] denotesj-th bit
of B, and BUI. 12, ... , jd, the bitwise XOR summation
BUd EB BU2] EB ... EB BUk]. The formula (4) illustrates I
round ofAES code.
'02'eS(p; )ffi'03'eS(l(i+l) mod 4)ffi'01'eS(l(i+2) mod 4)
ffi'O l'eS(1(1+3) mod 4) ffi K i = Ci
(i=0, 1,2,3) (4)
We can get the formula (5) when we pick up the linear
relation of the O-th bit key (Ko[Ol) in (4).
S(Po)[7] ffi SUmO,7] ffi S(P2 )[0]
ffi S(P3 )[0] ffi Co [0] = Ko[O]
(5)
Combining the formula (5) with the maximum and
minimum bias' linear approximations of I-bit output
modified by MixColumn operation (Table 2 and (3», we
find an effective linear approximation formula among the
Oth-bit of key and ciphertext and several bits of plaintext:
Po [0,3,4,5] ffi ~ [2,4,5] ffi P2 [0,2,3,5] ffi P3[0,2,3,5]
ffi I ffi Co [0] = Ko[O]
(6)
The reason why '1' appears in the left hand side is that
the number of approximations used in (6) which have
negative bias is odd. Using the above approximation,
Ko[O] is predictable by chosen plaintext attack. We
illustrated the flow of this linear approximation in Fig. 2.
By the same way as above, we can obtain linear
approximation formulae for Ko[I]- Ko[7], and estimate
all bits of Ko. We can obtain 5 effective linear
approximations for each Pi (i=0, 1, 2, 3) because there
are just 5 linear approximations of the maximum or
minimum bias for the demanded output mask. Therefore,
we can use such 54=625 linear approximations to
estimate a key, which produces good results; the more
linear approximations one uses, the less chosen
plaintexts one needs to estimate a cipher key.
2.4 Linear Analysis (2-Step)
We assigned a position number i (i=0, I, 2, 3) to the
operation multiplied by '02', '03', '01', '01' in
MixColumn. To deal with the round operation which
consists of ByteSub (S-box) and MixColumn, we
introduce two functions, Upstream and Downstream as
follows.
For an output mask (x), an input mask (y), a
MixColumn position number i and h (h=O, 1, 2, 3, 4),
Upstream(x,i,h), Downstream(y,i,h) denote an input
mask, an output mask which derive from h-th maximum
or minimum bias' linear approximation of output mask
(x), input mask (y) modified by multiplicative operation
of number i, respectively.
1, 2-round keys stand for KI, K2. AES cipher of
2-round is expressed by:
Po
1[0,3,4,5]
~
li7l
[0]
P1 P2 P3
1[2,4,5] 1[0,2,3,5] 1[0,2,3,5]
S-box~~
[0,7]~~
MixColumn
Fig. 2. I-round AES cryptanalysis (see text).
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MixColumn (S(MixColumn (S(P)) EB KI))
EBK2==C
(7)
We can construct a linear approximation formula using
Upstream or Downstream in the way of Kl-pivot or
K2-pivot, respectively.
Case 1. KI -pivot.
The linear approximation involving KI[O] was given by
Po[Upstream(O,O,ho)J) EB lj[Upstream(O,I,~)]
EB ColDownstream(O,O, h2 )]
== Klo[O] EB K2o[Downstream(0,0,h2 )]
(O~ho, hlJ h2~4) (8)
When we choose opportune ho, hlJ h2of Upstream and
Downstream in (8), we get approximation formula:
Po [0,3,4,5] EB P,[2,4,5] EB Co[l,2,3,7]
== KIo[O] EB K2 o[I,2,3,7]
(9)
We illustrated the flow of the above linear approximation
in Fig. 3.
Case 2. K2 -pivot.
The linear approximation involving K2 [0] was given by
Po [Upstream(Upstream(O,O, h2 ),0, ho)J)
EB lj[Upstream(Upstream(O,O,~),I,~)] EB ColO]
== K2o[O] EB Kl o[Upstream(0,0,h2 )]
(10)
When we also choose opportune ho, hI. h2of Upstream in
(10), we get approximation formula:
Po[2,3,6] EB lj[0,I,2,4,5] EB Co [0]
== K2o[O] EB Kl o[0,3,4,5]
(11)
By the same way as (9), (11), the linear approximation
that involves only one bit of KI or K2 can be constructed.
Since there are each five combinations of masks of Po
and PI of (9) in §2.3, the key can be estimated accurately
by using many combinations.
By the chosen plaintext attack against the linear
approximations, a system of linear equations whose
unknown quantities are all bits of keys Ki o and K20 is
obtained. The keys can be forecasted by solving a system
of linear equations on GF(2). Their coefficients are
derived from Upstream and Downstream in Case 1 and 2.
As there are 16 unknown quantities in the equations, the
system is in need of more than 16 linearly independent
Po
1[0,3,4,5]
P2
1[0,2,3,5]
P3
1[0,2,3,5]
9 S-box 99[7] [0,7] [0] [0]
MixColumn
10 ----J [0] K11 ----J K12 ------; K13 ------'~
I s-jox II s-jox 19S-box
[3,6]
MixColumn
o----J K21 ----J K22 ------; K23 ------;
1,2,3,7]
K
K2
Fig. 3. 2-rounds AES cipher analysis (see text)
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equations. We prepare 32 linear equations for an
assurance of linear independence. These 32 equations are
arranged in order: Klo[O] , ... ,Klo[7]- pivot for
Downstream( , ,h), K2o[0], "', K2o[7] - pivot for
Upstream( , ,h'), Klo[O] , ,Klo[7]- pivot for
Downstream( , ,h"), K2o[0], , K2o[7]- pivot for
Upstream( , ,h"'). The system of linear equations is
formulated by a coefficient matrix B = (bi), a vector of
unknown quantities x = (x;) and a constant vector c = (Ci)'
that is, Bx=c. The bits of keys are arranged as follows:
X = (Klo[O], ... , Kl o[7], K2o[0], ... , K2o[7])
The element of vector is determined by:
[
0", if j - th linear approximation holds
Cj = in the majority of chosen plain texts
I· .. otherwise
The elements ofB are determined as follows.
(1) bi,i = bi+s,i+s = bi+16,i =bi+z4,i+s =1(0::; i::; 7)
(2) If Downstream (2 i ,0, '?)U mod8] = I,
then bi) =1(0 ::; i ::; 7)
(3) If Downstream(i mods ,0,h'z)Umod8] = I,
then bi) = I (16 ::; i ::; 23)
(4) IfUpstream (2i modS,O,h"z)U] = I,
then bi) = I (8::; i ::; 15)
imodS '"(5) IfUpwnstream(2 ,0, h z)U] = I,
then bi} = I (24 ::; i ::; 31)
(6) Otherwise bi} =0
3 RESULTS
3.1 Cryptanalysis for I-step
We conducted a computer experiment in the linear
cryptanalysis for two cases: (A) 2 -byte plaintexts (Po,
PI) attack, (B) 4-byte plaintexts (Po, PI> P2, P3) attack. A
set that is composed of two or four linear approximations
for (Po, PI) (A) or (Po, PI> P2, P3) (B) which are chosen
from 5 candidates (§2.3) is utilized for attack of I-round
AES. The experiments of (A) were made under the
condition of I, 5 and 25 sets served with attack, while the
experiments of (B) were made under the condition of I, 5
and 625 sets served. 25-sets (A) and 625-sets (B)
consisted of all 52, 54 combinations, while 5-sets (A , B)
were selected to have no common candidates. We
summarized these results in Tables 3 and 4.
3.2 Cryptanalysis for 2-step
We carried out a computer experiment in the linear
cryptanalysis attack against the incomplete 2-rounds
AES that MixColumn of second round was omitted from,
due to a technical reason. The above limitation made 2
bytes plaintext attack effective, so the whole 2562
plaintexts were used in the attack. We could not increase
the number of chosen plaintexts because the whole texts
were already used, therefore we adopted the majority
rule among the combination of systems of the linear
equations that were derived from the selections of (h',
h"') (§2.4) to estimate the keys of 2 rounds correctly,
which was named as multi-system in contrast with the
former as single-system. The experimental results were
shown in Table 5.
Table 3. Success rates of the linear cryptanalysis by 2-byte chosen texts (A).
Number of chosen Number of linear approximations sets served with attack
plain texts
5 25
N'r SRb N'r SRb N'r SRb
1,000 800 5.10 800 32.63 800 79.13
3,000 800 17.75 800 81.00 800 98.50
5,000 800 33.50 800 94.38 800 99.75
10,000 800 60.50 800 100.00 800 100.00
15,000 800 80.25 800 100.00 800 100.00
20,000 800 89.88 800 100.00 800 100.00
a Number of trials, b Success Rate (%)
K. Sakamura et al. / Linear cryptanalysis of AES 25
Table 4. Success rates ofthe linear cryptanalysis by 4-byte chosen texts (B).
Number of chosen Number of linear approximations sets served with attack
plain texts
5 625
NT" SRb NT" SRb NT" SRb
1,000 800 1.63
10,000 800 0.38 800 0.50 800 5.50
50,000 800 0.52 800 0.73 800 48.00
100,000 800 0.75 800 1.12 800 78.00
500,000 800 1.00 800 3.25 800 85.38
1,000,000 800 1.88 800 7.13
5,000,000 800 6.00 800 37.50
10,000,000 800 14.25 800 70.13
20,000,000 800 29.13 800 95.13
"Number of trials, b Success Rate (%)
Table 5. Success rates in the incomplete 2 rounds
AES. The number of trials being 1000.
Table 6. The substantial biases of 2-byte chosen texts attack
(A).
Firstly, for the attack against I-round AES we compared
the success rates obtained from the computer experiment
with the theoretical ones based on Lemma 2 in (Matsui,
Number of linear approximations set
served with attack
1.22E-03
1.66E-03
5 625
8.35E-05
1.86E-04
Substantial bias
100,000
500,000
10,000,000
20,000,000
plaintexts
Number of Number of linear approximations set
chosen served with attack
1994). The bias that was derived from XOR sum of two
linear approximations the biases of which were equally
at 2-4 was computed at 2 1(2-4)2=2"7 on the basis of
Piling-up Lemma (Matsui, 1994). While the success
rate on the attack of i 2 (1/4 (2"7r2) chosen plaintexts
would be theoretically expected to be at 84.1%, the
attainment of this rate was in need of about 16,000
chosen plaintexts in the experiment (Table3). In this case,
the substantial bias would be estimated at 3.6xIO·3• In
Table 6, we listed the substantial biases corresponding to
the success rates in Table 3. Actually, the substantial bias
for 5 sets served with attack was nearly equal to the
theoretical bias, and such bias for 25sets was about
double as much as the theoretical bias. As the theoretical
bias for XOR sum of four linear approximations was
computed at 23(2-4)4=2-13, 224 chosen plaintexts attack
Table 7. The substantial biases of 4-byte chosen texts attack
(B).
25
1.28E-02
1.98E-02
1.99E-02
91.8
97.7
5
8.02E-03
1.12E-02
Success rate (%)
Substantial bias
1.34E-03
3.48E-03
4.5 IE-03
Method
Single-system
Multi-system
1,000
3,000
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
Number of
chosen
plaintexts
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would expect the success rate at 84.1%. However, we
needed about 3 billion in number to attain this rate in the
experiment. In Table 7, we also listed the substantial
biases corresponding to the success rates in Table 4.
Similarly, the substantial bias for 5, and 625 sets served
with attack were about one and ten times as much as the
theoretical bias in this situation (B).
Secondly, we analyzed the experimental results in the
incomplete 2 rounds AES attack. It is impossible for one
set of linear approximations the bias of which would be
estimated at 2-10 to attack 2 round keys with success rate
at 84.1 %, because it would require 218 plaintexts, which
exceed the whole number 2 16 of plaintexts. Therefore, we
carried out 25 sets attack (§3.2). In this situation, the
substantial bias was computed at 2-1.98xl0,2 _2,4=2.48x
10'3 that can realize the success rate at 89.8 % with the
whole plaintext (2 16) attack, which agrees with the rate at
91.8% in the experiment. The adoption of the majority
rule, the multi-system attack, also contributed to an
improvement of the success rate (Table 5). For the
complete 2-rounds AES attack involving MixColumn of
the second round, the substantial bias is estimated at
2-1.66xlO'3 _2-4=2.08x 10-4, when 625 sets attack (§3.1)
are used. About 5.8 million plaintext attack can attain the
success rate at 84.1 %.
Finally, we study the limitation of this method. For 3 or
4 rounds AES attack, the substantial bias would be
reduced to about 2"155 or 2,18.5, even if 625-sets attack
would be used. Therefore, the necessary number of plain
texts would increase to 229 or 237, respectively. In due
consideration of the whole number of plaintexts (232), we
come to the conclusion that this method would not work
well on more than 3 rounds.
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